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FOREWORD 
This executive summary report synopsizes the results of a contracted study of a 
manned Space Operations Center. The study was an outgrowth of an earlier study 
conducted at the NASA Johnson Space Center in 1979. The contracted activity 
began in June of 1980. The initial contract increment covered the period from 
June 1980 through July of 1981~ A set of contract reports were provided to NASA 
at the conclusion of the initial contract increment. A subsequent contract 
increment was initiated in August of 1981 and technical work was completed in 
December 1981. This executive summary report covers the results of both the 
initial contract increment and the add-on increment. It therefore reflects the 
results of the entire study. 
This study was managed by the lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. The Contracting 
Officers Representative and Study Technical Manager was Sam Nassiff. This 
study was conducted by The Boeing Aerospace Company, large Space Systems, 
Group with Grumm'an 'Aerospace and the Hamilton Standard Division of United 
Technologies as subcontractors. The Boeing study manager was Gordon R. 
Woodcock. The Grumman study manager was Ron McCaffrey. The Hamilton 
Standard study manager. was Harlan Brose. 
This £lllal report incluc.i~s five documents: 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The initial study of Space Operations Center programmatics {Boeing-19, Section 
111 and Boeing-20, Section 18) induded considerations of program structure, cost, 
hardware commonality, schedules, and program phasing. The follow-on study 
included tasks that required that the development plan be updated, that planning 
options be developed, and that a SOC user charge plan be created. This document 
presents the integrated discussions of program ~tructure,cost, schedules, system 
buildup options, funding prOfiles, and recommended technology levels that 
resulted from both studies. 
This report was prepar~d to provide a convenient summary of the results of the. 
Space Operations Center (SOC) Phase A Study relating to SOC cost, program 
options and program recommendations. 
Program options were analyzed with respect to mission needs, design and 
technology options~ and anticipated funding constraints. A reference design for. 
. .' 
the Space Operations Center provided the basis for cost analyses, but the 
programmatics analysis found an alternate design to t-r> preferable in view of 
estimated mission nee~s and funding requirements and ceo. traints. The referen'ce 
andaltern'ate designS, and tt:!chnical rationale for preference of the alternate are 
discussed bel'lw under Design and System Options. 
1 
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2.0 SUMMARY OF MISSION NEEDS 
A mission needs analysis was conducted to provide a basis for SOC re~irements, 
designs, and program recommendations. This analysis' is reported in detail in 
Volume 3 of this document set. A brief summary and conclusions are presented 
here. 
Mission models were derived from historical trends, NASA planning documents, 
and from budgetary and economic considerations. Budgetary and economic 
factors were given dominant consideration over all other factors. ,Mission 
foreca$ts from earlier mission models were adjusted (in most cases downward) to 
conform to estimated budget realities. Economics-based forecasts were used for 
commercial uses of space. 
The result was a set of mission modt>ls that were dominated by the commercial 
and defense sectors. This outcome was not surprising inasmuch as economic 
growth and ddequat~ defense are important national priorities; the approach used 
for development of 'the models inherently reflects such priorities. 
Three models were created, representing low, median, and high projections of 
future SPace activities~, A summary of the models is presented in Figure 1. 'These 
graphs show mission events (not shuttle flights!) per year, div: ded into the major 
mission model sectors. " 
The mission models were analyzed to determine their demand for space transpor-
tation and SOC services. Alternative ways of satisfying the transportation 
demand were investigated. It was found that the most effective space tra..sporta-
tion option was use of the space shuttle with a high-energy aerobraked, 
space-based orbit transfer vehicle. The transportation demand can be satisfied 
with 40% fewer shuttle flights by the advanced-technology OTV as compared with 
an ail-propulsive ground-based OTV. Aerobraking offers the greatest leverage; 
space-basing and implementation of shuttle external tank scavenging to improve 
propellant logistics ope-rations were also fount! to offer cost benefits. 
With the advanced-technology upper stage, the low and median mission models 
could be sati~.ied by a five-orbiter fleet, assuming each orl)iter can be used ,ten to 
2 
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twelve times a year. The iugh "model demand "exceeds one hundretj shuttle flights 
by the year 2000. This model represents a forecast i'l which extensive commer-
cial and military operations are ca .. ried out in space. Development of a 
se.c0nd-generation space transportation system by the mid 19905 is consistent 
with the high model scenario. 
Dema,.J for SOC services in the low and mediz,n models could be satisfied by the 
SOC designs described in the following section of this report. In the low model, a 
single station with a crew of 12 suffices. In the median model, implementation of 
a second SOC by about 1995 is needed; the second station would be dedicated to 
research and applications 0Peratims, primarily life sdences and materials proces-
sing development. The high model requires a total of more than fifty people in 
space by the year 2000. As is true for space transportation, development of :l 
second-generation or much expanded space station would likely occur by the end 
of the r.entury in this scenario. 
4 
-----
•••• ...J 
,. 
.. 
". 
3.0 DESIGN hNDSYS'iEM OPTIONS 
The reference SOC design ilIustr'\ted in Figure 2 meets the system requiremcts 
contained in the SOC requirements document. However, a number of reasons 
have developed for considering alternative mOOular concepts. The principal ones 
are the following: 
I. A number of alternative uses for the basic hardware set and technology ha~e 
been identified, including military applications, small geosynchronous sta-
tions, and stations designed primarily to support materials processing 
dev'!iopment and other science and applications operatio.u. 
2. If it were desired to place a manned station into.:;. high inclination orbit, :~ 
would be necessary to have modular fle)iib!!~ti'. The '''eight' of each module 
would nave to be compatible with the Shlltt!"payloa"; capability limitations 
for high inclination lilunct.es 1rom WTR. 
3. Simultaneous de~'elopment of a Service Mod~le, a Habitat \10dule, and a 
Logistics \;cd11Ie, as po!>tulated for the reference program, leads to funding 
profile problems. 'ihe required funding escalates more rapidly and peaks at 
higher level:; th.:;.n anticipated funding capabilities. In order to re!>olve this 
'issue, a systClii design is needed that leads to initial operation:; with' fewer 
5i mul taneous de ve 1c~men ts. 
4. The mission needs analysis conducted as a part of this study identified a 
need for a Space Operations Cent::r accommodating up to ~ 2 people for the 
median traffic model by the year .200:>. (A second station. devoted entirely 
to microgravity application". with d crl!w of eight, may also be needed by 
the year 2000.) 
5. The same mission needs analy~is indicated that an initial operatio"3l 
capability with a crew of four would suffice for a period of two to four 
years. This .. ss~mes that the orbit transfer vf>hic1e would be ground-b.l:.ed 
for this period of time. An incrern<:>ntal build-up approach is rnost 
compatible with these rnission needs. 
5 
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6. The missj~ needs analysis indicated a need for additional interior space for 
science clnd applications missions. 
3.1 A.L TERNA TIVE MODULE AND SUBSYSTEM DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 
The need to create a manned space station technology adaptable to diverse 
mission~. ha~ led to a versatile modular approach to space station design. The keys 
to this approach are (1) standard subsystems employing advanced technology to 
permit a long, useful life without obsolescence, and (2) modularization of the 
design at a level below that of complete station modules to allow creation of a 
variety of system configurations. Preliminary results indicate versatility to 
render a design as small as a single Shuttle-launched station and one large enough 
to support a crew of 12 to 20, all employing the same basic hardware set. 
This alternative approach evolved from the original SOC Service Module. The 
Service Module includes the essential elements of a space station, including 
electrical power supply, consumables supply, and elements of the environmental 
cor.trol, thermal control, data management, and communications subsystems. 
The first step in this evolution was equipping of the reference Service Module 
with emergency survival equipment, so that in an emergency, Oi1e Service Module 
could provide subsistence and life support for up to four crew members. 
The next logical step improved the habitability provisions in the Service Module so 
that it alone could serve as a modest space station with adequate, if austere, 
habitability provisions. The improvement of accommodations led to increasing 
part of the service module diameter to improve its habitability, a concept initia!ly 
explored in an IR&D investigation of a small single-launch military space station. 
Two alternative Serv~ce Module options evolved. One was called the "German 
Hand Grenade" concept, with a short section 4.4 ml.:ters in diameter, attached to 
a tunnel section approximately two meters in diameter. The stores and equipment 
that had been located on the 2.5-meter diameter section of the original service 
module were packaged on the 2-meter diameter section of the German Hand 
Grenade module as illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Further development of this approach has evolved a smaller diameter, but longer, 
habitability section for the modified Service Module. Reducing the diameter 
allows masts and booms to be packaged alongside the larger diameter section. 
This minimizes the number of joints. Packaging volume along the small-diameter 
sections at the ends is adequate for tanks and other external stores. The 
subsystems alternatives are discussed later in this section. Table I gives a mass 
estimate for this Service Module. 
The relative lengths of the large and small diameter sections of this modified 
Service Module are dictated by the volume requirements for external stores. A 
representative configuration is sketched in Figure 4. 
A deficiency of the German Hand Grenade concept was a shortage of berthing 
ports to accommodate space transportation equipment in the space-based upper 
stage scenario. A space-basoed upper stage used for the median traffic model 
requires two berthing ports for propellant tanks, and two additional ports for OTV 
hangars. At least one further port is required for the manned cabin section of the 
manned orbit transfer vehicle. This port need not necessarily be on the bottom 
side of the configuration·., 
Additional ports are also needed for resupply modules, experiment modules, and 
space testing pallets. It is important that these accommodations not encroach 
into the satellite servicing ~nd space construction section of the station. The 
Service Module must provide an adeq":<l.te number of IJorts. Installing ports in the 
full-diameter section of the German Hand Grenade concept requires recessing of 
the port with attendant structural complexity and encroachment into interior 
volume areas. 
Habitat Modules of 4.2 meters diamf:'ter can be added to the program at a later 
date. The versatile modular design approach permits the length and interior 
arrangements of these habitats to be tailored to the mission requirements. For a 
SOC in low inclination, low Earth orbit, a full-length (lI~-meter) habitat system 
can be incorporated. Two such habitats will accommodate up to eight additional 
crew, for a total of 12 .. Overflow capacity within these modules is also available 
in the form of additional area that can be devoted to sleep stations for transient 
visitors not allocated a private quarters area. 
9 
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Table 2 
SOC·15:;s Habitable Service ~kdule 
.1. 
Nickel Hydrogen Battery Regenerative FUel Cell 
Energy Storage Energy Storage 
Title Mass kg (Ib) Mass kg (Ib) 
Structures 6798 (14987) 6798 (149B7) 
M~hanisns 408 (899) 4(113 (899) 
'!hennal Control 1454 (3206) 1364 (3007) 
Aux Propulsion 483 (1065) 587 (1294) 
ordnance 10 (22) 10 (22) 
Electrical Rno/er 3983 (8781) 3478 (7667) 
GN&C 420 (926) 420 (926) 
Tracking & Communication 653 (1440) 653 (1440) 
Data 11anaganent 481 (1060) 481 (l060) 
Instrumentation 100 (220) 100 (220) 
Crew kcc l1odation 306 (675) 306 (675) 
EC/LSS & ~cew Systems 1911 (4213) 1911 (4213) 
Mission Equipment & Consumab1es 2594 (5719) 1844 (4065) 
Growth 4082 (8999) 3854 (8497) 
Total 23683 (52212) 22214 (48973) 
10 
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Electrical power modularity and adaptability is provided by design of a standard 
power section incorporating solar arrays and eners;y storage. These elements are 
~odular at a level that permits a ~mallest increment of raw power supply on the 
order of 10 kilowatts. Units can be grouped together to provide higher power 
levels. The array size is tailored to the power level desired. System redundancy 
improves as power level is increased. Each module of a'1Y station element will 
receive raw power from the power supply and wi!! provide its own power 
conditioning. 
Data management modularity is provided through federated processing. ihis is a 
variant of distributed processing in which each processing element is capable of 
operating stand-alone; but is tied to a data bus for sharing of data with other 
processors to enhance integrated operation of the entire system. Advanced 
processors will ensure that adequate capability exists to accommodate any 
conceivable requirement. Rapid advances in microprocessor technology now offer 
computing power overkill ilS cheap insurance against future limitations. A 
standardized high lev~l.l~guage, probably ADA, will be employed. 
The environmental control and life support system will incorporate air and water 
processing equi pment in. two-man increments. Equipment is replic:;ated to serve 
larger crews·. A set of 'eqUipment designed to serve four or more people will 
degrade gracefully with failures. As the number of people served increases, the 
redundancy and resilience of the system also increases. Standardization of 
equipment and interfaces will enable all· presently known needs to be served by 
the basic equipment set. 
At the two-man level, i.e., in a single-launch space station, the environmental 
control and life support system will have only fully operational and fail-safe 
modes. A major failure would require initiation of emergency mode operations. 
Attempts to restore. the system to service would be carried out in parallel with 
initiation of rescue plans. For any station larger than the basic two-man 
increment, fail-operational, fail-safe capability would exist. 
A. standard set of communications equipment will serve a variety of needs. 
Communication needs in UHF, S-band, K-band and micro-wave have been 
identified for the SOC missions. These will serve most applications. Special 
12 
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equipment and features may be required for cer' un military applications. These 
can be interconnected with the standard equipment set through standardized 
interfaces. Use of fiber optics communication buses throughout will facilitate 
meeting communications security requirements for any special applications. 
The recommended alternative SOC implementation sequence related to the 
median traffic model and mission needs analysis proceeds as follows: 
A single Service Module is launched by the initial Space Shuttle flight. This 
module will include the basic SOC command and control work station, together 
with food preparation, hygiene, suit storage and contingency sleep sections. This 
initial Service Viodule 'could be used as a two-man space station.' It would provide 
relatively. comfortable accommodations for a crew of four when docked with a 
Shuttle Orbi ter. 
A second Shuttle launch would bring up a second Service Module identical to the 
first e:<cept for ciifferent interior arrangements. This second module would 
contribute sufficient haliitability features to allow the two modules ':0 accommo-
date a crew of four in reasonable comfort. 
This initial station comprised of two Service Modules would satisfy the median 
model identified mission needs ior SOC for two to three years. These mission 
needs include shakedown of SOC operations, early research and applications 
missions, demonstration of the essential technologies required for space-basing 
the Orbit Transfer Vehicle, and flight support operations for a ground-based Orbit 
Transfer Vehicle. 
Three or more years after the initial SOC launches, a sequence of three additional 
build-up launches would complete the basic station configuration by adding two 
habitat modules and a docking tunnel leading to the configuration illustrated in 
Figure .5. This configuration could accommodate up to 12 people and accom-
modate all of the mission needs identified for SOC through 1995 to 1996. At the 
time transition to space-based OTV operations is desired, four additional Shuttle 
launches would bring up two space-based orvs, two hangars, and two propellant 
storage tanks for the space-based orvs. At this point, the SOC would be capabl~ 
13 
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of accomplishing' all of the mission functions identified in t'he mission needs 
analysis. 
In the latter part of the I 990s, an increase in the anticipated mission needs for 
science and applications, especially materials processing, coupled with a gradual 
decline in available power for support of experiments because of degradation of 
the solar array, would motivate the build-up of a second SOC dedicated to the 
science and applications missions. This SOC would be designed to support a crew 
of eight with additional internal space made available for science and applications 
operations, as well as the use of berthing ports to support res.e~rch and 
applications pallets and modules in place of orbit transfer vehicles and construc-
tion projects. Soorter versions of the Habitat Modules might be used for this SOC 
configuration. 
\ .. 
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4.0 PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND \JORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE 
Recognizing the potential of setting precedents in establishing a work breakdown 
structure, we set forth the criteria in Table 2 as a precursor to preparing the WBS 
itself. These criteria are aimed at minimizing the program problems that could 
be introduced by an illogical WBS •. 
The SOC WBS that was used in the present study is soown in Figure 6. This WBS 
formed the outline for the System Description document and Vias the basis for 
mass and cost analyses. 
~6 
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3. 
4) 
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6) 
7) 
8) 
Tl-IE WBS SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF PROGRP.M PHASE. EACH ELEMENT INCLUDES 
ACTIVITY AND COST BY PHASE. 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH ELEMErn SHOULD Be CLEARLY ASSIGNABLE. 
THE was SHOULD PP.ESENT LOGICAL ~'JOAK PACI{AGES AND INTERFACES. 
THE was SHOULD FACILITATE DIRECT MANAGEMENT CONTROL. 
THE was SHOULD NOT INHIBIT FREEDOM OF CONTRACTING OPTIONS. 
THE WBS SHOULD ENABLE STRAIGHTFORWARD COST MODELING. 
niE was SHOULD ALLOW DIRECT DERIVATION OF SOC USER CHARGES. 
THE was SHOULD BE A SUITABLE OUTLINe FOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION, 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTJOi~S. AND MASS AND COST ESTIMATES. 
Table 2. SOC Work BreiJkdown Structure Criteria 
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PRECEOiNG PAGE BLI\NK NOT FILMED 
5.0 COST ANA!. YSES FOR THE REFERENCE SOC 
Figure 7 illustrates the flow of the parametric cost estimating process. Two 
separate parametric cost models were used. The Boeing Parametric Cost Model, 
or PCM, is used to estimate hardware costs. Jt is based on historical experience 
from Boeing plograms, and the structure of the model simulates cost experience 
for the functional elements of the Boeing organization. Rather than simply 
estimating dollars versus weight, the Boeing PCM estimates man hours versus 
weight (or other physical parameters), for design and for direct factory labor, and 
then applies historical experience factors for the various supporting functions of 
development shop, quality control, systell.s engineering, test, liaison, etc. 
For large complex software systems, a parametric estimating method that factors 
software from hardware characteristics is not satisfactory. Consequently, the 
software cost estimates from Boeil"g PCM were suppressed to low values. These, 
software estimates are' considered representative of the software to be used as a 
part of the design, development and test process. The flight software was 
separately estimated utilizing the PRICE-S model developed by RCA. 
, , . 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the paramet:ic cost estimating activity in 
terms of costs for th~ major program elements as a function of program phase. 
The costs tabulated for the operational and growth phases are additive to those 
estimated for the initial phases. 
It is important to note that if the program is stretched out to create an extended 
gap between the initial and operational SOC, additional design and development 
expense will be incurred. Further, if the program is stretched to the point that 
the production operations for the program elements mu;;t be shut down and 
restarted, further additional manufacturing costs would be incurred. 
The costs for the three phases of the reference SOC program are compared in 
Fisure 8. These figures are not additive, i.e., each pie chart represents the total 
estimated cost through that phase of the program. The costs presented are totals 
for contract end items, and cngineerint; and operational support items additive to 
the C(lntrdct end items.' 
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It may be seen that the habitat and service modules dominate the initial SOC 
program and become progressively less important as more program elements and 
mission equipment items ~1"e added. 
The data displayed in Figure 9 show total costs fer one contract end item. On the 
left-hand side are shown the costs associated with subsystem and system design 
and development. These costs are those reGUired to process the subsystems 
through qualification. It may be noted that electrical power is the major 
subsystem in the service module. The ECl-S3 and crew systems include the 
emergency survival equipment added to the service module for the initial Space 
Operations Center configuration. 
The right-hand pie chart shows total contract-end-item costs. As may be seen, 
design and development are only about 2096 of the entire program. Other 
elements include test and test hardware, manufacturing and flight hardware 
support equipment, tooling, special test equipment, launch and build-up support, 
system engineering and'integration, and program management. Commonality with 
concurrent or prior programs only leverages the cost of design and development of. 
the flight hardware. This can provide significant cost savings, but forced 
commonality, using existing hardware ill-suited to the desired functiOn can impact 
the other 80% of the total program cost. Forced commonality may incur a net 
cost increase rather than savings. 
A preliminary estimate of the annual funding for the program is presented in 
Figure 10. The illustrated funding spread was developed for the operational SOC 
configuration using the data in Table 3, with the initial and operational SOC costs 
are combined. This is a relatively typical development program. 
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6.0 SCHEDULESJi.ND SCHEDULE ANALYSES 
Schedules for SOC development were laid out U!~:,g analogous experience with 
programs of similar size and complexity. Certain assumptions are implicit in the 
sChedules: 
(1) Significant teChnology advancements will be carried at least tc' the proof-
of-concept stage by technology advancement activities prior to initiation of 
Phase C/O for SOC. If the technology advancement is critical, a full 
l technology demonstration may be required. 
(2) Accordingly, program delays caused by technology immaturity will not be 
encountered. 
(3) Shuttle launch service will be available on a timely basis for SOC buildup; 
further, the SOC buildup will not be constrained by availability of facilities 
at KSC. 
(4) End item fabrication and test activities are phased so that on..:. set of tooling 
for each end item type, and one test cr;~w, can accomplish the required 
fabrication arid·testing. 
Tj .~~ schedule analys'cs concentrated on the fabrication, test, ar.d integration 
schedules incorporating assumptions (3) and (4). 
Because the flight SOC will be finally assembled in space by berthing modules 
together using the Shuttle, it was seen as very important to v"!idate, both 
mechanically and functionally, the berthing interfaces on the ground before 
launch. Subsy~tems such as electrical power, EC/lS, communications, and data 
management interface through these berthing ports. This need led to the concept 
of a ground test vehicle (GTV). The GTV is comprised of one Service Module, one 
Habi tat Module, one Logistics Module, and a Docking Tunnel interface simulator. 
All subsystems in the GTV will be flight or flight prototype hardware. 
The GTV will initially serve an integration role to prove out the proper operation 
of the subsystems th.at interface through the berthing ports, and wi!. later serve 
27 
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to validate flight hm-dware interfaces at KSC before each flight article is 
launched. Finally, after the flight system is fully built up in orbit, tt.e GTV will 
be returned to JSC to serve as a "hangar queenll for simulation, training, and 
checkout of procedures, subsystem updates, and software changes before these 
are implemented in the flight system. It will b-~ necessary to begin training and 
simulation actMties for the flight crew before the Grollld Test Vehicle is 
available. Engineering mockups and developmental hardware will be used for this 
purpose. 
A high-level program schedule, based on the schedule analyses referenced above, 
is shown in Figure ll .. This high-level sche~ule includes the Pha.~e B study activity 
and presumes a new start in FY85. 
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7.0 REFERENCE sec BUILDUP OPTIONS AND FUNDING PROFILES 
Funding profiles were investigatd for three program options. These were (I) 
direct buildup to the operational SOC configuration; (2) buildup to the initial SOC 
configuration with a two-year gap before resuming buildup to the operational 
SOC; (3) direct buildup to the operational SOC core with deferral of mission 
equipment such as the mobile crane and orv hangars. 
The principal finding frorn the buildup options analysis for the reference SOC was 
that stretching out the program was not an effective way of reducing pC<lk 
developmental funding. Higher costs of engilleering and manuiacturing activities, 
caused by program discont:;iuities, largely offset peak funding reductions realized 
by the slower schedule. Deferring some of the mission equipment (cherrypicker, 
OTV hangar, etc.) is a more effective means of reducing peak funding. 
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FUNDING SPREAD ESTIMATES FOR ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM BUILD-UP 
SEQUENCES 
A build-up seq.Jence fO(' the alternative SOC design was analyzed to determi~ its 
funding requirements. It is tailored to the mission needs ascertained by the 
median traffic model analysis. The build-up schedule is srown in Figure 12. This 
build-up schedule uses the habitable service module design concept to permit 
initial operations with only two service modules and a lOgistics module placed in 
orbit. The development of the habitat module is deferred so that it becomes 
available in the fourth year of the flight operations program. In this alternative, 
space-basing of OTV operations begins in the same year so that as the SOC is 
built-up to reference capability the equipment and facilities fO(' OTV space-basing 
are added. 
In 1995, additional construction eq-,Iipment is added for assembly and test of large 
platform spacecraft. Funding req'!ircments are shown in Figure 13 and Tables 4 
and 5. The peak funding is reduced by about 25% as compared to the reference 
program, and the peak occurs four years after program start rather than three 
years. The funding peak could be further reduced by an additional year'!, deferral 
of the habitat module. The additional deferral, however, would delay certain 
mission capabilities enough to impact accomplishment of the mission model. 
Actual timing of the startup of the habitat module 'can, of course, be adjusted to 
meet mission needs as they actually develop. 
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C§L'~ l\1odular Evolutionary Program 
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(4 CREW) (12 CREW) (CONSTR. EQUIP, ADDED) 
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70 25 25 
22 76 275 195 25 15 
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150 150 90 
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(3) (6) (2) 
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TABLE. 5 
YEAR-BY-YEAR FUNDING FOR SOC EVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 
Program Y E2r 
Program Elements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Habitable SM ODT&E 107 152 166 152 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Habitable SM Prod 0 0 146 171 151 96 0 0 0 0 0 
Logistics MOD DDT&E 17 24 26 24 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 I::' 
-1 .. 0 
w Logistics V.OD Prod 0 0 41 48 42 27 0 0 0 0 0 9 U1 N 0\\ 
Habitat ~10D DDT&E 0 0 0 0 86 122 134 122 86 0 0 ...:a 00 
VI 
Habitat MOO Production 0 0 0 0 0 55 89 108 110 88 0 . N 
Docking Tunnel DDT&E 0 0 0 0 11 16 17 16 11 0 0 
Docking Tunnel Prod 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 24 21 14 0 
Mission Equip 111 DDneE 0 26 35 35 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mission Equip III Prod 0 0 0 54 57 39 0 0 0 0 0 
Mission Equip 112 DDT&E 0 0 0 0 78 111 121 . III 78 0 0 
Mission Equip 112 Prod 0 0 0 0 0 100 117 103 66 0 0 
Mission Equip 113 DDT&E 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 50 55 50 35 
Mission Equip 113 Prod 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 50 44 28 
Software 36 46 51 52 50 46 itO 33 23 13 0 
Build-up Support 0 0 0 18 34 48 59 65 66 56 0 
. :T-otal 160 248 465 .' 554 659 660 633 675 566 265 63 
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9.0 SOC COST /BENEFrr ANALYSES 
In order to develop a preliminary comparison of potential SOC benefits to 
estimated SOC costs, the costs were allocated to categories of research and 
development, investment, and operations. These were then contrasted with 
potential benefits, induding increased business and economic growth, cost savings 
for conducting space research needing crew involvement, and cost savings for 
space operation.<i. 
The research and development costs for the Space Operations Center, including 
all modules, but excluding production and production-related costs, were esti-
mated to be approximately $4 billi~n in 1982 dollars. A potential benefit accruing 
from this development is improved marketability of U.S. space systems and space 
operations to support wcrldwide commercial uses of space. This improvement 
would stem from lower cost of operations and ability to provide types of service 
not elsewhere available. 
A representative all-up shuttle flight, using an c:.dvanced-technology upper stage, 
will be valued at about $200 million. This figure includes the shuttle and IJpper 
stage costs as well as the cost of the spacecraft being launched. It is 
representative of a platform-class communications satellite of the type· forecast· . 
for use in the 1990s; 
There are several ways of evaluating the economic benefit derived from this 
representative flight. The most favorable is a holistic view, predicting that the 
competitive advantage deriving from superior space operations capabilities would 
attract not only additional launch services business, but also additional spacecraft· 
development and production business. In this view, the entire value of the launch 
is an economic benefit to the U.S. 
A less favorabie. view is one in which only the launch service business is a net 
inflow to the U~S. In this instance, the economic benefit will be more like $60 
million. 
If added spacecraft and launch services business is attracted from fcreign 
competition, tht:n: an indirect multiplier should be included in !he calculation. 
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Indirect multipHers have been variously estimated from two to seven. <Indirect 
multipliers do not apply in the same way to economic activity transferred from 
one economic sector to another within the U.S. M~t 'sectors have similar 
multipliers, and the losing sector loses its multiplier effect as well. Further, an 
economist might argue that imports must be balanced by exports, but this seems 
to be more truc in economic theory than it is in actual practice.) 
If the research and development investment in the Space Operations Center is 
retired over a 15-year period at a 10% discount, the annual cost ofr~~irement of 
this investment is' approximately $525 million. Thus, to break even, the avail-
ability of the SOC for transportation and satellite servicing operations needs to 
attract roughly two..and-one-half Shuttle flights per year to the United States, ' , , '. 
from foreign suppliers of such service. This assumes that the entire value of the 
flight is a benefit, but tbat there is no indirect multiplier. With the indirect 
multiplier, even the attracting of only one equivalent Shuttle flight per year to 
the U.S. system might well amortize the R&D investment in the Space Operations," 
Center. If only t~,launch services business is a net benefit, several flights of 
added business would be needed to break even. Table 6 summarizes sample 
calculations. 
In orde~ to compare \nvcs'tment and operations ''Osts with the benefits of the new 
capabilities and cost savings, the investment and operations costs were lumped 
together in order to determine an equivalent cost per man-day for SOC opera-
tions. T •• ble 7 presents a summary of this calculation for the 12-man SOC 
configurc;;~ on indicated as desirable by the medicm traffic model mission needs 
analysis. 
One of th' benefits accrued by availability of the Space Operation Center is the 
ability to (onduct research and applications missions at less cost than would be 
the case w:thout the Space Operations Center available. Table 8 compares the 
cost per nian-day for research and applic.\tions missions with Shuttle and 
Spacelab. Also included in the Table is an estimate of the relevant Shuttle and 
Spacelab costs. Since U.S. space transportation pricing policy will be to make the 
pricing for space transportation operations commensurate with actual costs after 
1983, the costs used here, al·.:·ough derived from the STS reimbursement gUide, 
have been adjusted for estimacf',.J actual costs. 
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Table 6. Research and Development Amortization 
R&D COST ESTIMATE (1982$) 
INITIAL . 2273M 
INCREMENT FOR 
OPERATIONAL gOBM 
EQUIPMENT 
INCREMENT FOR 
SPACE·BASING AND 853M 
. CONSTRUCTION EQUIP. 
TOTAL (034 
ANNUAL COST FACTOR 
10% DISCOUNT 8& 15-YR WRITEOFF: 
F • 
0.10 
1- 1 
~.115 
• 0.131 
ANNUAL COST • 0.131 X 4034M 
.. $530M 
VALUE OF A SHUTTLE FLIGHT 
SHUTTLE FLIGHT 60M 
UPPER STAGE 
USE CHARGE 
10M 
ItJDIR:CT MULTIPLIER-
VARIOUSLY ESTIMATED AS 2 TO 7. 
SOC OPERATIONAL BENEFITS NEED 
·-
SPACECRAFT 15'Ji'J' 
TO ATTRACT 0.4 TO 1.3 EQUIVALENT 
SHUTTLE FLIGHTS IN EUSSINESS EACH YEAR 
ROUGHLY 2007,,'. 
DIRECTL V ATTRIBUTABLE JOBS: 5000 TO 10,000 PER FLIGHT PER YEAR. 
.--",' "..-
I 
Table 7. SOC Investment and Operations Amortization 
SOC·lf:53 
.... STRAIGHT·L1NE AMORTIZATION CREW SIZE (MAX) 12 
; 
I 
15 YEARS $250M WQR K DAYS/yR 313 I I 
BESUPPL Y PEA YEAR $200M 3756 MAN DAYS/YEAR 1 ~ , 
~ 
FLIGHT CREWS· 3 X l~ S36M OR 1 
@ $iM/YR 0 ~ 
-w 00 
to OPERATIONS SUPPORT $ 20M' $42M FOR A RESEARCH PROJECT C? ~ 
AVERAGlrJG ONE FUlL·Tfi.'E 0'1 
-..l 
SQa PEOPLE Q $401( CREW MEMOER FOR A YEAR. 00 VI 
I . ~ 
TOTAL $5OGMIYR 
• 17·TOrme PAYLOAD YIELDS USE CHARGE FACTOR OF 0.769 
SHUTTLE CHARGE .. 0.7Ca X GOM.. $33.4M 
eXTRA DAY $ 1 M 
LOGISTICS MODULE O?ERATiOI'JS $10 M (GUESS) 
$49.4M, FOUR TIMES PER YEAR 
•• ~ ••• ",.~",_.""_.,, J __ '_. 
A 
o 
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Table 8. Shuttle-Spacelab Comparison 
REIMSURSE~ .. 1ENT ESTIMATED 
GUIDE ACTUAL 
1975$ 19B2$ 1982$· 
r-
SOC 
RESUPPLY 
1932$ 
SHUTTLE 18 28 50 (X.768) 39.4 
ELEC. PWR CRya KIT 
EXTRA DAYS (9) 
P/L SPECIALISTS (4) 
SPACE LAB 
0.3 0.5 1 
2.7 4 9 (1) 
1.2 1.85 2 
5.4 8.3 70 LM OPS 
82 
TAKING CREDIT FOR ONE FLIGHT CREW MEMBER, 
SHUTTLE/SPACE LAB MANDAY COST IS 
$G2M 
.. $1.64M 
5 X 10 
. . .. 
1 
10 
49.4 
.1 
! 
1 
! j 
I 
i 
i 
~ 
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To estimate the benefit from the reduced costs for SOC operations, we used an 
elastic demand model. This concept and the benefit calculations are summarized 
in Figure 14. It is estimated that the demand for research and applications 
missions at Space lab costs and the timeframe of interest would be met by 
approximate!y three 10-day Spacelab missions per year. The e!:timated research 
activity level for materials processing used in this example for the Space 
Operations Center median traffic model is approximately 900 man-days per year, 
or six times that which would be conducted with the Shuttle and Spacelab. 
However, were costs to remain at the Shuttle Spacelab level, this additior.c:.l 
research would not be conducted because it is too expensive. The elastic demand 
model ;r,ays that as costs are reduced additional demand will come forth. 
The benefit derived from the reduced cost of SOC thus is far less' than one would 
determine from assuming that all of the additional research and applications 
capability of SOC would be accomplished at a value equal to that for operating 
Shuttle and Spacelab. 
The demand for So'C'research applications was estimated for the three mission 
models. The dif.ferences in demand for the three models was not attributed to 
differences in cost, but rather reflect an uncertainty in the actual level of 
demand. This could be 'regarded as an uncertainty in the elasticity of demand. 
The elasticity of demand was modeled by applying an exponent to the cost, in the 
form illustrated in Figure 14. As the predicted demand is varied, so are the 
parameters in the equation. A summary of results for the three traffic models is 
as follows: 
Total Annual 
Benefit 
Average Including 
Research Variable Fixed Value of 
Model Crew Size EXEonent 'Multielier Benefit $226 \\ 
Low 2.93 -1.38 1.66 x 109 $218 ,'vi $44/+ M 
Median 5.12 -1.056 0.325 x 109 $350 M $576 M 
High 9.46 -0.838 0.109 x 109 $564 M $790 M 
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ESTlfIIATED SPfI.CELAB DEMAND: 
150 MAN DAYS (3 FLIGHTS) PER 
YEAR @ $1.64M PER f,1ANCAY 
200 
r.'EMAND CURVE 
C" $!:i94M (MD) -1.176 
I [lOO 1000 
MANDAVS PER YEAR 
TOTAL BENEFIT: $513M PER YEAR 
ESTIMATED SOC DEMAND: 
1250 MANDAVS (3 CREW 
PER YEAR 0 $13S1{ FER 
MANDAV 
1200 
Figure 14. Research and Applications Benefits Estimate Elastic Demand Model 
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A third category of be'nefits arises f~om the reduced number of space transporta-
tion flights required to service the traffic model with the availability of the Space 
Operations Center. This (alculation is presented in Figure U. The benefit of 
reduced numbers of Soottle flights exceeds the cost of the additiooal SOC crew 
required to service these flights for the space-based OTV possible only with a 
Space Operat~.;ns Center. The further added benefit (',f the use of external tank 
sca venging is comparable to that for space-basing (I! the OTV. This b1:nefit has a 
net present value at tin time of development of the scavenging capability of 
approximately a billion dollars for the median traffic model. 
The calculations (resen"ted did not take credit for reduced time on orbit for the 
Space Shuttle Orbiters for the presence of SOC. Earlier estimates have indicated 
that the reduced on-orbit time will reduce the re~ired fleet size by roughly one 
Orbiter. This reduction in fleet size represents an additional billion dollars in 
benefi t for the Space Operations Center. 
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ANUUAL 
SHUTTLE 
FLIGHTS 
UiUlTLE FLIGHIS + OTV. EXPENOED 
40 
+ OTV. :tJ r--:-__ -",:;-__ 
EX.>fNDED 
CRi:W 
FlEQUIREO 
:tJ 
1U 
C,UE 
GROWJD 
S;>ACI; 
S?ACE WITH 
~V 
TOTAL 
FLIGHTS 
112 VAl 
4aJ 
431 
337 
FLlGI1TS 
::"~VE[) 
In VH) 
G2 
~ACE·3ASINQ SAVES 62 0 ~u .. tl.C::13 
.. 
Ava 
~!WED 
Fii: i1 vr: 
10 
soc CREW REQUIRED 
CHANGE AOD / TO t7ACE· SEcor~D 
BASED ON roc 
v 1// 
, 
/~ 
~ 
/ 
I 
I /Gnourm 
I~~I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
SfJACE.QASlr4Q COOT'S: 
'til.' 
.,:,,5 
,-
CX'ER.lOC 
+ LAaSOC 
- 12 
- 0 
O?I:R. 
SOC 
1425 AVG EXTRA CfiE\1 X 12 VR X 31% WO;jK-DAYSIYR 
X .1:J;(J'r.tA~DAY. 1'.678 
Figure 75, OTV Basing: Space vs Ground (Median Traffic Model) 
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10.0 RECOMMENDED TECHNOLOGY 
A key part of programmatic considerations is the selectio., of technology levels 
for implementation. This represents a tradeoff among ccst, risk, sche~l.lle, and 
the desire to apply enough technology advancement that the planned system will 
not be obsolete when operational. Conscious technology selections were made for 
all of the SOC subsystems. The SOC Technology Identification Support Study 
Final Report (Boeing-23) contains the results of the technology identification 
analyses. Table 9 summarizes the technology recommendations developed in this 
study. These recommendations were also used as a basis for technology 
advancement recommendations. 
Certain technology advancement needs carry with them significant schedule 
implications. Most important are the areas for which life testing of flight 
prototype hardware may be needed as a part of the development program. Two 
such areas for SOC are the EC/lS systems and the electrical power system. In 
both areas, technology advancements are proposed, the proper operation of the 
hardware is critical.to.crew safety, and the required hardware life is challenging. 
These areas merit special consideration in developin~ plans to proceed with 
technology advancement so as to accomplish the life tests in a timely manner. 
Another area needing specia! attention is software. Our ·es·timatcs of the desired 
schedule for SOC software development showed that it will require longer than 
the hardware. The software schedule·can be accelerated, but only at higher cost 
and greater risk. The problem can be alleviated by carrying out a data 
management architecture technology program and by initiating software design 
and development as a part of the SOC Phase B studies. 
45 
SOC1057 
SYSTEM OR SUBSYSTEM 
PRIMARY STRUCTURE 
BOOM & TRACK STRUCTURES 
SECONDARY STRUCTURES 
THERMAL CONTROL 
• HAO r,:OOULE COATING 
--
.' 
Tabla 9. Recommended Technology Levels 
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SYSTEM OR SUBSYSTEM 
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FLUID LOOPS 
PROPULSION 
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Tab!fJ 9. (Cont'd) 
RECO~"i~~ENDED LEVEL STATUS 
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. DEVELOP1.1ENT 
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11.0 PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS 
Pre-Phase B 
------
There is a near-term need for additional analysis and definition of key SOC 
subsystems. This can be done with confidence that the results will be applicable 
to the system design that is developed by the Phase B preliminary design; the 
technical definitions of these subSystems are nearly independent of specific 
mission applications and are relatively independent of configur.J.tion. These 
studies could provide valuable technicai inputs to Phase B and pro~~bly shorten 
the time needed t'o conduct a Phase B preliminary design. Specific rec.ommended 
studies are as follows: 
Comparative design definition of battery and re;:~nerative fuel cell electric power 
systems. Preliminary studies, summarized in the following section of this report, 
indicate significant advantages for the regenerative concept, in which high-
pressure electrolysis units are lIsed to regenerate reactants from water. A. 
comparative design' study in greater depth is needed to make a fina! selection~' 
This study should also investigate design integration of the solar array masts. 
These masts will be quite complete, carrying electric power, data, thermal 
control, propulsiori, ar:td .communications services. They must be deployed when 
the electric power section or service module f(,~' the SOC is launched. 
Data management and $oftware systems analysi~. Studies to date have indicated 
a strong preference for advanced' technology microprocessors, and a federated 
processing system architecture. The new standard DoD high-level language, 
ADA, offers great promise for reducing software costs. A systems analysis and 
design study should be carried out, including high-level preliminary design of 
software elements needed early in the program, integration of displays and 
controls considerations, and selection of a specific architecture and communica-
tions protocol. Even though the architecture might be changed later in Phase B, 
the resl.its of the pre-Phase B study would be invaluable as an input, allowin~ the 
Phase B study to immediately get the design specifics. 
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Flight control and dynamics analysis. This study would have to use representative 
configurations, but the results would be generally applicable to other configura-
tions in the SOC class. Dynamics modeling is needed to develop the requirements 
for technology advancements in adaptive control and flight control systems. The 
dynamics modeling should include analysis of zero-g slosh dynamiCS with cryo-
genic propellant storage for orbit transfer vehicles. 
Communications system analysis. An analysis, conceptual design, and technology 
assessment should be made for millimeter-wave communications systems and 
traffic control radar. Needs for high data rates and immunity from RFI can best 
be met by millimeter-wave systems. 
Phase B 
Phase B studies should be vertically-integrated, even though later procurements 
may be implemented as separate contracts for each SOC module. The vertical 
integration, i.e., preliminary design of the entire system, is necessary to obtain 
the proper understanding of system, subsystem, and operational interrelationships. 
Phase B should conceiltrate on the modules to be developed first, but should 
render sufficient design detail on later modules that all interfaces are thoroughly 
understood, and so that specifications can be written for the later modules 
without.resort to further Phase B study. 
Development 
The alternate system option is recommended for development, rather than the 
reference design. The alternate system better meets presently-identified mission 
needs and is more compatible with expected funding capabilities. 
Development of the SOC and of an advanced-technology orbit transfer vehicle 
should be coordinated. Both are needed to satisfy forecast mission needs. 
Transition to space-based operation of the orbit transfer vehicle should occur as 
soon as practical, but initial operation should be ground-based to (0 develop 
operational experience with the vehicle, and (2) allow time for development of 
efficient zero-g propellant transfer and management systems. 
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NASA-& Cost Specification for Space Operations Center Study, LR-IS-1561, 
Feb. 27, 1980. 
NASA-9 Statement of Work for Space Operaticns Center System J\nalysis 
Contract Extension (NAS 9-16151), Exhibit B, August 1981. 
NJ\SA-lO Space Operations Center Review, Status to Director, Johnson Space 
Center, September 15, 1981. 
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Boeing-l SOC System Analysis Technical and Management Proposal, Vol. 1, 
0180- 25834-1, Feb. 18, 1980. 
Boeing-2 SOC System Analysis Business Proposal, Vol. 2, 0180-25834-2, Feb. 15, 
1980. 
Boeing-3 SOC System Analysis Study Plan, 0180-25941-1, May 1980. 
Boeing-4 SOC Technology Assessment and Advancement Plan Study -Sl.atement 
of Work, 0180-25941-2, May 1980. 
l3oeing-5 SOC System Analysis Monthly Progress Report No.1, June 19, 1980. 
Boeing-6 SOC System Analysis Monthly Progress Report No.2, July 19, 1980. 
Boeing-7 SOC Systern "Analysis Monthly Progress Report No. (~, Sept. 19, 1930. 
Boeing-8 SOC System Analysis Monthly Progress Report No.5, Oct. 17, 1980. 
. , .. 
Boeing-9 SOC Syste,!l) Analysis Monthly Progress Ri.:port No.7&. 8, Jan. 19, 1981. 
Boeing-IO SOC System Analys.is Monthly Progress Report No.9, Feb. 19, 1981. 
Boeing-ll SOC System Analysis Monthly Progress Report No. 10, April 19, 19&1. 
Boeing-12 SOC System Analysis Monthly Progress Report No. 11, May 19, 1981. 
Boeing-13 SOC System Analysis, First Quarterly Briefing, DI80-26127-1, 
Sept. 3, 19&0. 
Boeing-14 SOC System·Analvsis, Midterm Briefing, DI8O-26209-1, Dec. 2, 19&1. 
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Boeing-15 SOC System Analysis, Third Quarterly Briefi! .• 011:::'26433-1, 
March 31, 1981. 
Boeing-16 Requirements for a Space Operations Center, 01&0-26135-1, Dec. 1980 
(Draft). 
Boeing-l7 Space OperatiOf's Center System Analysis, Final Report, Volume I, 
Executiye Summ2l'Y, 0180-26495-1, July 1981. 
Boeing-18 Space Operations Cen".er System Analysis, Final Report, Volume II, 
Requirements (NASA CR-160944), DI80-26495-2, July 1, 1981. 
Boeing-19 Space Operations Center System Analysis, Final Report, Volume III, 
SOC System Definition Report, DI80-26495-3, July 1981. 
Boeing-20 Space Operations Center System AnalysiS, Final Report, Volume IV, 
System Analysis Rel?2rt, DI80-261.95-4, July 1981. 
Boeing-21 Space Oper~tions Center System Analysis, Final RepOrt, Volume V~ 
. Data Book, DI8O:..261.95-5, July 1981. 
Boeing-22 (Reserved) 
Boeing-23 Space Operations Center Technology Identification Support Study, Final 
Report, DI80-261~95-7, July 1981 
Boeing-24 Space Operations Center System Analysis, Final Report, volume VI, 
Final Briefing. Dl 80-26495-8, June 25, 1981 
Boeing-25 Space Operations Center System Analysis. Study Extension, Technical 
and \1anagement Study Plan, DI30-26544-I, September 8, 1981. 
Boeing-26 Space Operations Center System Analysis, Study Extension \Hdterm 
Briefing, DI80-26715-1, October 15, 1981. 
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Boeing-27 Seace O~ra~ions Ct."Ilter System Analvsisz Study Extensionz lV\onthl~ 
Progress Re(Xlrt No. I, October I, 19&1. 
Boeing-28 Seace O~tions Center S~stem Anal~sisz Stud)! Ext~n5iont \1onthl~ 
Progress Report No. 2, '~ovember 1, 1981. 
Boeing-29 SEace O~rations Cent~r Slstem Anal:lsisz Stud>: Extensionz '''onthly 
Progress Report No. 3t December l z 1981. 
Boei.lg-30 Sedce O~rations Center System Analysis, Stud>: Extem:ionz Final 
Report z Volll".e I, Executive Sumrnary~ 01&0-26785-1, January 1982. 
Boeing-31 Space Operations Center System Analysisz Study Extension, Final 
Report, Volume II, Programmatics, 01 &0-26785-2, January 1982. 
Boeing-32 Space Operations Center System Arolysis.J... Study Extension, Final 
Report, Volume Ill, Final Briefing, 0180-26785-3, January 12, 1982. 
Boeing-33 Space. Operations Center System Analysis, Study Extension, Fimt 
Report, Volu:ne IV, Svstem~ Analysis Report, DI80-26785-4, January 
1982. 
Boeing-34 Space Operatic~",s Center System Analvsi:;, Study Extension, Fin::.! 
Report, Requirements for a Space Operations Cent.£.!:.t. (NASA CR-
160944), 0100-26495-2A, January 1982, (This )s revision of a 
Boeing - 18). 
Boeing-35 Spa.:e Operations Center System Analvsis, Study Extension, Final 
Report,Volume !II, SOC System Definition Report, 01SO-26495-3A, 
January ~ 982. (This is Revision A of Boeing -19). 
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Space Operations Center - Shuttle Interaction Study 
Monthly Progress Report No.1, 80 MA 4564, August 1980. 
Space Oocrations Center - Shuttle Interaction Study 
Monthly Progress Report No.2, September 1980. 
Space Operations Center - Shuttle Interaction Study 
Monthly Progres!: Rep()rt No.3, October, 1980. 
Reserved. 
Space Operations Center - Shuttle Interaction Study 
Monthly Progress Report No.5, SO MA 6428, December 1980. 
~pace Operations Center - ShJttlL Jntcraction StudY,.. 
Monthlv Progress Report N~, 81 MA 05&6, January 1ge1. 
Space Operations Cente:- - Shuttle Interaction StU['y_ 
M.2~thlv Progress Report /\lo. 7,81 Ml\ 126g, February 1981. 
Reserved. 
Space Operations Center - Shuttle Interaction Study 
First Quarterly Review, PD 80-55, Sept. 3, 1980. 
Soace Operations Center - Shuttle Interaction Study 
~'idterm Review, PD SO-72A, Dec. 3, 1980. 
Space Operations Center - Shuttle Interaction Study 
Final Review, PO 81-7, ,"arch 31, 1980. 
Space Operations Center - Shuttle Interactions Study, Final 
Report, Executive Sumrnary, SSD-81-0076, April 17, 1981. 
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Rockwell-13 
Rockwell-14 
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01 SO-2678.5-2 
ROCKWE.l.L !}OCUMENTS 
Space Ooerations Center - Shuttle Interactions Study, Final 
Report, Volume 1.550-81-0076, April 17, 1981. 
Space Ooerations Center - Shuttle Interactions St~l::1y, Final 
Report, Volume 2 Book I, 5SD-81-0076, April 17, 1981. 
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